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Abstract
Information network analysis has drawn a lot attention in recent years. Among all the aspects of network analysis,
similarity measure of nodes has been shown useful in many applications, such as clustering, link prediction and
community identification, to name a few. As linkage data in a large network is inherently sparse, it is noted that
collecting more data can improve the quality of similarity measure. This gives different parties a motivation to
cooperate. In this paper, we address the problem of link-based similarity measure of nodes in an information network
distributed over different parties. Concerning the data privacy, we propose a privacy-preserving SimRank protocol
based on fully-homomorphic encryption to provide cryptographic protection for the links.
Index Terms
Privacy; Similarity;
I. INTRODUCTION
Real network data usually consist of objects of different types, forming a so called heterogeneous network. A
heterogeneous network contains abundance of information, which gives rise to a great interest in its analysis such as
clustering, classification, centrality measure, object ranking and pattern mining [4, 7, 14], to name a few. Among all
the aspects of heterogeneous network analysis, measuring the similarity between nodes is one of the most important
problems. Answering how similar nodes are is essential in many applications, such as clustering, link prediction
and community identification [1, 5, 12].
According to the evaluation of [13], link-based similarity measures [6, 9, 10] well conform with human judgement.
In the work of [10], the similarity of two nodes can be understood as a weighted count of the number of all-length
paths between the nodes. In [9], the similarity can be regarded as the probability that a node A reaches a node B in
a restricted random walk manner. Both the measures proposed in [10] and [9] are applied on undirected networks.
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Fig. 1. The rental data of on-line movie stores A, B and C.
SimRank [6] defines the similarity score of two nodes A and B as the expected meeting distance, i.e., the expected
distance that two random surfers, starting at node A and node B respectively, travel before they meet at the same
node. Among all the link-based similarity measures, SimRank[6] is one of the most influential approaches [11]
for following reasons. First, SimRank similarity score is independent to the clustering approaches, and thus can be
applied to various kinds of clustering methods. Second, SimRank can be applied on both directed and undirected
graphs, which give a great flexibility in analyzing heterogeneous networks. Furthermore, SimRank can work on any
graphs that have object-to-object relations, without the need of domain knowledge.
In reality, however, data are often distributed among different parties. For example, Figure 1(a) shows the rental
data in three on-line movie stores. Consider that an on-line movie store wants to build a recommendation system for
its customers. Based on the rental records, SimRank can provide a good similarity measure for clustering the movies
of similar types. However, the clustering result may still not be good enough since the amount of rental records
is also a dominant factor. Combining the rental data from different stores for clustering, as shown in Figure 1(b),
surely can improve the performance of movie recommendation systems. This gives the on-line stores a motivation
to cooperate.
Whenever different parties cooperate, data privacy is an important concern. In the above example, the on-line
movie stores may not be willing to reveal their network data to each other since the links indicating the rental
information, i.e., customer-rent-movie, are usually one of the most valuable assets for a company. Revealing the
rental information of a company may allow its competitor to be able to analyze its customer behavior and use
the information against the company. Therefore, how to cooperatively compute SimRank similarity score without
exposing any sensitive information, i.e., links between objects, becomes a crucial problem. To the best of our
knowledge, there is not yet any studies addressing this problem.
It is challenging, under the constraint of link protection, to calculate the link-based similarity of nodes in a
network distributed over different parties. As the similarity calculation is based on the link information of the entire
3network, it is essential to securely integrate the distributed data into a synthesized graph. For example, according
to the similarity definition of SimRank, two nodes are seen as similar if the neighbor nodes they connect to are
themselves similar to each other. As the result, the entire graph structure needs to be considered when computing
similarity scores between nodes. However, synthesizing graphs without exchanging any link information seems
daunting. Without the knowledge of the entire graph structure, we can’t even correctly identify the neighbors of a
certain node. How to build a combined graph having access to the information we need and avoid revealing each
party’s link information in the same time is an issue needed to be solved.
Specifically, in this paper we take the link-based similarity measure defined by SimRank [6] and address the
problem of privacy-preserving similarity measure in a joint bipartite network consisting of data from two or more
parties. For such a problem, it has the challenges on (1) how each party can guarantee its link protection in a way
that allows the construction of a structure containing the information involved for similarity measure, and (2) how
the similarity is calculated on such a structure. To tackle these challenges, we propose a new protocol called privacy-
preserving SimRank (PP-SimRank) based on fully-homomorphic encryption FHE [2, 3]. FHE takes only 1 or 0 as
inputs, outputs different ciphertexts with random noise introduced, and has both the addition and multiplication
homomorphic properties. Therefore, the XOR- and AND- operations on a plaintext are equivalent to the addition
and multiplication on the corresponding ciphertext. PP-SimRank then utilizes these properties to construct virtual
joint networks in ciphertext field. By extending the similarity definition to the virtual networks, PP-SimRank is able
to calculate SimRank scores without knowing the link information in the bipartite network of each party. We show
that PP-SimRank can protect the link information in a semi-honest model, where a semi-honest security model
restricts all parties to faithfully follow their specified protocol, but allows the parties to record all the intermediate
messages for analysis. In addition, to overcome the constraint of FHE taking only 1 or 0 as inputs, PP-SimRank
converts the SimRank scores into binary representations and carries out the score computation in ciphertext field
with binary arithmetic operations. That is, we demonstrate an application of FHE in practice.
Generally, the contributions of this paper include:
1) We are the first to address the problem of link-based similarity measure co-computation over distributed
information network.
2) We propose a privacy-preserving protocol, PP-SimRank, to securely compute SimRank similarity score over
distributed data. PP-SimRank is the first privacy-preserving protocol that focuses on link-based similarity
measure co-computation.
3) We carry out the implementation of basic arithmetic operations, i.e., addition, subtraction, multiplication and
division, in the ciphertext field under fully-homomorphic encryption, demonstrate an application of fully-
homomorphic encryption scheme and show its potential in privacy-preserving data mining.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II formally defines our problem and provides the background
knowledge to our work. Section III describes our Privacy-Preserving SimRank protocol in details, and Section IV
discusses the implementation issues. We then analyze the complexity and security of the proposed PP-SimRank in
4Section V, extend PP-SimRank to multi-party scenario in Section VI, and conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section, we formally define the problem and provide the necessary background. We first formulate the
problem in Section II-A, and give a brief review of SimRank in Section II-B.
A. Problem Formulation
In this paper, we address the problem of privacy-preserving computation of link-based similarity measure over
horizontally partitioned information network in different parties. Our target is to protect the link information and
achieve the computation of SimRank score simultaneously. For simplicity, we first focus on two-party scenario, and
then show the extension to general cases.
In a two-party scenario, two parties called Alice and Bob hold information networks GA = (V A, U, EA) and
GB = (V B, U, EB), respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that V A and V B are disjoint vertex sets,
and U is a vertex set known to both Alice and Bob. The parties wish to cooperatively learn the SimRank similarity
scores S(ui, uj) of all vertex pairs {ui, uj} ∈ U using their joint data, i.e., G = (V A ∪ V B, U, EA ∪ EB). For
privacy concern, the problem is how to construct the virtual information network G without revealing EA and EB
and how to perform the SimRank computation on the virtual information network G.
For example, consider that Alice and Bob are two on-line movie stores. Alice and Bob have different customer
groups, V A and V B , respectively, and the same movie set U . A rental record is then a link connecting vi with
uj . When both Alice and Bob regard their own rental records as sensitive data, the problem is that, how Alice
and Bob can construct a virtual graph G = (V A ∪ V B, U, EA ∪ EB) without revealing EA = {(vAi , uj)} and
EB = {(vBi , uj)} to each other, and learn the SimRank similarity score S(ui, uj) of all the movie pairs to improve
their movie recommendation system.
For this problem, ideally, Alice and Bob would find a trusted third party to perform all the needed calculations
for them. That is, Alice and Bob would securely transmit their data to this trusted third party. Let the third party
compute the movies’ pairwise similarity scores using SimRank and send the result information back to both Alice
and Bob. However, such independent third parties are very hard to find or do not exist in the real world.
Instead of counting on a third party, we proposed a privacy-preserving protocol, PP-SimRank, based on fully-
homomorphic encryption (FHE) [2, 3] to protect the link information. The fully-homomorphic encryption method
takes the plaintexts of binary form, i.e., {0, 1}, as inputs and outputs the ciphertexts in the form of big integers. Given
the same plaintext and the same public key for encryption, FHE will output different ciphertext (big integer) with
random noise, i.e., there is a negligibly small probability [3, 8] that Enc(1) = Enc(1). Therefore, FHE is semantic
secure against chosen plaintext attacks and is suitable for link encryption. In addition, FHE has the following two
properties.
5PROPERTY 1. Addition-homomorphic
c1 + c2 = Enc(m1) + Enc(m2) = Enc(m1 ⊕m2), (1)
PROPERTY 2. Multiplication-homorphic:
c1 × c2 = Enc(m1)× Enc(m2) = Enc(m1 ∧m2), (2)
where the two ciphertexts c1 = Enc(m1) and c2 = Enc(m2) represent the encryption outcomes of the plaintexts
m1 and m2 respectively. Accordingly, the addition and multiplication operations on the ciphertexts are equivalent to
the XOR- and AND-operations on the corresponding plaintexts. We can, therefore, carry out arithmetic operations
such as addition, subtraction, multiplication and division in the ciphertext field, using the homomorphic properties
of FHE [2, 3]. By restricting the computation of SimRank similarity score in the ciphertext field, we can achieve
the protection of link information.
Further, we will show that PP-SimRank can keep the link information remain hidden in a semi-honest security
model.
B. SimRank Overview
SimRank [6] is a similarity measure based on the linkage information in a network. Two objects are regarded
as similar ones if they are related to similar objects. Specifically, let S(vi, vj) denote the similarity between two
nodes vi and vj in a network G = (V,E). The iterative similarity computation equation of SimRank is as follows:
S(vi, vj) =
dout
|O(vi)||O(vj)|
|O(vi)|∑
k=1
|O(vj)|∑
l=1
S(Ok(vi), Ol(vj)), (3)
S(ui, uj) =
din
|I(ui)||I(uj)|
|I(ui)|∑
k=1
|I(uj)|∑
l=1
S(Ik(ui), Il(uj)), (4)
where O(vi) or O(vj) denote the set of out-neighbors of nodes vi or vj , I(ui) or I(uj) denote the set of in-neighbors
of nodes ui or uj , and dout (din) is the decay factor.
To simplify the SimRank score computation, SimRank derives a node-pair graph G2 = (V 2, E2). Each node w
in V 2 is associated with a node pair < a, b > in G, i.e., a, b ∈ V . The presence of an edge between two nodes
< a, b > and < c, d > in G2 represents that there exist edges (a, c) and (b, d) in G or, there exist edges (a, d) and
(b, c) in G. In G2, each node w is associated with a SimRank score giving a measure of similarity between the
two nodes of G represented by w. The neighbors of w are the nodes whose similarity is needed to be considered
when the SimRank score of w is computed.
Figure 2(a) shows an example of the joint rental data of two on-line movie stores Alice and Bob. Figure 2(b)
is the corresponding node-pair graph G2, where the isolated nodes are omitted. There is an edge in G2 between
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Fig. 2. The combined renter data of online movie stores Alice and Bob.
Fig. 3. Privacy-preserving SimRank protocol.
the nodes < Movie1,Movie2 > and < Renter1, Renter2 >, because Renter 1 rents Movie 1 and Renter 2 rents
Movie 2 in G.
In SimRank method, the node-pair graph G2 is proposed to explicitly figure out the propagation of similarity
scores between pairs of nodes. Later, we will further incorporate the node-pair graph G2 into the definition of
similarity so that PP-SimRank is able to calculate the SimRank score in ciphertext field.
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING SIMRANK PROTOCOL
A. Protocol Overview
We now introduce a new protocol called Privacy-Preserving SimRank (PP-SimRank) based on fully-homomorphic
encryption (FHE). In this protocol, there are two essential roles: cryptographer and calculator. Cryptographer
determines the public-secret key pair (pk, sk) used for encryption/decryption of data, shares the public key with
other while keeping the secret key strictly to himself, and performs the decryption of encrypted SimRank score.
Calculator collects encrypted data from all parties, constructs the virtual network in the ciphertext field, and performs
the SimRank score calculation on the virtual network. As cryptographer does not have the virtual network and
calculator does not have the secret key for decryption, the SimRank score computation over distributed information
7network can be achieved while the link information of each parties’ data is protected.
Figure 3 shows the procedure of PP-SimRank protocol. First, one party, called Alice, determines the public-secret
key pair (pk, sk), and sends the public key pk to the other party, called Bob. After that, both Alice and Bob encode
and encrypt their data with pk, respectively, Alice then also transmits her encrypted data to Bob so that Bob will
hold a joint virtual information network G = (V A ∪ V B, U, EA ∪ EB) in the ciphertext field. Based on the joint
network G, Bob further builds a node-pair graph G2. Later, by incorporating the virtual node-pair network G2 into
the definition of SimRank similarity, Bob performs the SimRank calculation in ciphertext field. Finally, Bob adds
a random number to each of the final SimRank scores of the vertex pairs in U2, and sends the results to Alice for
decryption. Both Alice and Bob can then learn the SimRank similarity scores of the vertex pairs in U2 after they
exchange the decrypted scores and the corresponding added random numbers.
In this protocol, however, there are several challenging problems needed to be solved. First, the bipartite network
of each party has to be encoded and encrypted in a way that allows the constructions of the joint network G as well
as the corresponding node-pair graph G2 while the link protection is guaranteed. Second, based on the node-pair
graph G2 built in ciphertext field, the whole process of SimRank similarity computation has to be restricted in the
ciphertext field as well, since the FHE homomorphic properties hold only if the plaintexts are encrypted with the
same key. Moreover, it makes the problem even more challenging that FHE has the constraint of taking only 1 or
0 as inputs while the similarity score is a real number in [0, 1]. We will tackle these challenges step by step in the
following subsections.
In Section III-B, we explain how Alice and Bob encrypt their data so that Bob is able to construct the graph
matrix of the node-pair graph G2 in the ciphertext field. Section III-C shows how exactly the graph matrix of G2
is constructed. Based on G2, Section III-D gives the details of how the SimRank score computation is achieved,
when the computation is restricted in the ciphertext field.
B. Encoding and encryption of links
We now explain how the parties encode and encrypt their data in details. Without loss of generality, we assume
that both Alice and Bob know the total number of nodes in both U and (V A ∪ V B), i.e., m = |V A| + |V B| and
n = |U |, and all the nodes are ordered.
Note that the bipartite graph in our problem is not a weighted one. The direct relationship between two nodes
is either connection or disconnection, i.e., a link e ∈ {0, 1}. In many cryptographic encryptions, it will output the
same ciphertext given the same input and encryption key. As a result, the link protection still cannot be guaranteed
even though the data is encrypted.
To tackle this challenge, we propose PP-SimRank based on FHE [2, 3], which takes only 1 or 0 as possible input
and outputs different ciphertexts for a given input bit by introducing random noises in the encryption. That is, after
encryption, the ciphertext indicating the same bit varies. To hide the link information more effectively, we let the
parties encode not only the connections but also the disconnections between nodes into bit vectors and encrypt the
bit vectors using FHE. For Bob who receives Alice’s data, he thus cannot distinguish the ciphertexts corresponding
8Fig. 4. Two cases lead to an edge between (vx1, vx2) and (uy1, uy2).
Fig. 5. Or-equivalent operations.
to the 1- bits and 0- bits. The link information is effectively protected. On the other hand, as the link information
is encoded into bits independently and encrypted without other artificial noise (in addition to the random noise
introduced by FHE), Bob is able to utilize the homomorphic properties to construct the virtual graphs G and G2.
Specifically, for each node vi in V A (or V B), Alice (or Bob) will generate a bit vector EAvi (or EBvi ), where
EAvi , E
B
vi
∈ {1, 0}n, with respect to the connections and disconnections of vi to all the nodes in U based on her
(his) own data. Each element ei,j in EAvi (or EBvi ) is 1 if there is a link in GA (or GB) connecting vi and uj ∈ U ,
or 0 otherwise. After encoding all the link information into bit vectors, the parties encrypt every element ei,j in
the bit vectors EAvi and E
B
vi
to get the cipher vectors CAvi and C
B
vi
, where each element ci,j = Enc(ei,j), using the
same public key pk (determined by Alice in the previous step). According to the homomorphic properties of FHE,
Bob can thus collect the cipher vectors CAvi and C
B
vi
to construct a virtual joint bipartite graph in the ciphertext
field.
C. Construction of Virtual Graphs
This subsection shows how a joint virtual network G2, where G = (V A ∪ V B , U, EA ∪ EB), is constructed in
ciphertext field.
To construct the virtual network G2, knowing the link information is essential. However, since the link information
is hidden in the cipher vectors CAvi and C
B
vi
, it is impossible for Bob to construct a graph with explicit link
information. Instead, we let Bob construct the virtual graph G2 by filling the graph matrix M of G2 in ciphertext
field. Each cipher element of M can be derived by applying the homomorphic operations on the cipher vectors CAvi
and CBvi as follows.
Specifically, let wx =< vx1, vx2 > denotes a node-pair in G2, where v is a node in (V A ∪ V B), and wy =<
9ux1, ux2 > denotes the node-pair of U in G2. Recall that, in G2, there is an edge ǫx,y connecting the nodes
wx =< vx1, vx2 > and wy =< uy1, uy2 > if and only if (as shown in Figure 4), in G, at least one of the two
conditions in the following is satisfied.
1) {ex1,y1, ex2,y2} ∈ (EA ∪ EB): uy1 is an out-neighbor of vx1 and uy2 is an out-neighbor of vx2.
2) {ex1,y2, ex2,y1} ∈ (EA ∪ EB): uy2 is an out-neighbor of vx1 and uy1 is an out-neighbor of vx2.
That is, the value of ǫx,y can be derived by the following formula:
ǫx,y = case1 ∨ case2, (5)
where
case1 = ex1,y1 ∧ ex2,y2,
case2 = ex1,y2 ∧ ex2,y1.
When the OR-operation is carried out by XOR- and AND- operations, Equation (5) can be rewritten as follows
based on Figure 5.
ǫx,y = (case1⊕ case2)⊕ (case1 ∧ case2). (6)
Now consider this problem in ciphertext field and let πx,y be the corresponding cipher of ǫx,y in M . Due to the ho-
momorphic properties of FHE, the XOR-/AND- operation on the plaintext is equivalent to the addition/multiplication
operation on the corresponding ciphertext. The Value of πx,y can thus be derived as follows.
πx,y = Encpk(ǫx,y)
= (Encpk(case1) + Encpk(case2))
+(Encpk(case1)× Encpk(case2)),
(7)
where
Encpk(case1) = cx1,y1 × cx2,y2,
Encpk(case2) = cx1,y2 × cx2,y1.
Consequently, Bob can construct a virtual graph G2 for subsequent SimRank score computation, while the link
information is protected and hidden in ciphers.
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D. Computation of SimRank score
In this subsection, we explain in details that how Bob computes the SimRank score in ciphertext field, based
on the virtual network G2. As Equations (3) and (4) show, the SimRank similarity of two nodes vx1 and vx2 is
defined as the normalized sum of the similarities between their neighbors. In the ciphertext field, however, the
neighborhood information as well as the link information is protected and hidden in the encrypted graph matrix M
of G2. To compute the SimRank score, we then need to incorporate the graph matrix M into Equations (3) and
(4), and express the formulas correspondingly in ciphertext field.
First, consider to incorporate the graph matrix M into Equations (3) and (4). For v ∈ (V A ∪ V B) and u ∈ U ,
let wx =< vx1, vx2 > and wy =< uy1, uy2 > denote the node-pairs in G2, and ǫx,y be the element in M that
represents the connection/disconnection between the node-pairs wx and wy . The SimRank score associating with
wx and wy is:
S(wx)
= S(vx1, vx2)
=
dout
|O(vx1)||O(vx2)|
|O(vx1)|∑
i=1
|O(vx2)|∑
j=1
S(Oi(vx1), Oj(vx2))
=
dout
n∑
i=1
ex1,i
n∑
j=1
ex2,j
∑
wy∈G2
S(wy)× ǫx,y,
(8)
S(wy)
= S(uy1, uy2)
=
din
|I(uy1)||I(uy2)|
|I(uy1)|∑
i=1
|I(uy2)|∑
j=1
S(Ii(uy1), Ij(uy2))
=
din
m∑
i=1
ei,y1
m∑
j=1
ej,y2
∑
wx∈G2
S(wx)× ǫx,y.
(9)
In Equation (8), the ∑ni=1 ex1,i (∑nj=1 ex2,j) indicates the number of in-neighbors of vx1 (vx2), and S(wy) is the
SimRank similarity between vx1’s potential neighbor and vx2’s potential neighbor. Whether a S(wy) score will be
counted in the S(wx) or not depends on the value of ǫx,y ∈ {0, 1} in the graph matrix M of G2.
Now we show the corresponding calculation of SimRank score in cipher field. The challenge is that, both the
network G and the corresponding node-pair graph G2 are built in ciphers. We then need to encrypt the SimRank
similarity score using the same public key pk, since the FHE homomorphic properties hold only when the score is
encrypted in the same field as the link information.
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Specifically, note that the FHE method takes only binary integer, i.e., {1/0}, as inputs, while the similarity
score S(wx) is a real number ∈ [0, 1]. To allow the encryption of S(wx) using FHE, we encode the real number
S(wx) ∈ [0, 1] (as well as din and dout) into binary representation, i.e., a bit string, and encrypt the bit string into
cipher string. The arithmetic operations on the real numbers then change to the binary arithmetic operations on
the (bit/cipher) string. Let ×ˆ, ÷ˆ, and ∑ˆ denote the multiplication, division and sum binary arithmetic operations,
respectively. We discuss the implementations of the binary arithmetic operations in Section IV-A, and convert
Equations (8) and (9) into the following formulas in ciphertext field.
Θ(wx) = Encpk(S(wx))
= ∆ ×ˆ
∑ˆ
wy∈G2
(Θ(wy) ×ˆ πx,y),
(10)
Θ(wy) = Encpk(S(wy))
= 2 ×ˆ
∑ˆ
wx∈G2
(Θ(wx) ×ˆ πx,y),
(11)
where
∆ = Encpk(dout) ÷ˆ (
∑ˆn
i=1
cx1,i ×ˆ
∑ˆn
j=1
cx2,j),
2 = Encpk(din) ÷ˆ (
∑ˆm
i=1
ci,y1 ×ˆ
∑ˆm
j=1
cj,y2).
According to Equations (7), (10) and (11), Bob is able to perform the whole process of SimRank similarity
calculation in ciphers without knowing the explicit link information of Alice’s data. PP-SimRank, therefore, achieves
a secure similarity measure on a joint networks consisting of different parties’ data.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
A. Arithmetic operations in the ciphertext field
As mentioned in Section III-D, we implement the binary arithmetic operations to perform the addition, multi-
plication and division on the cipher strings representing Θ(w). First, we implement two virtual circuit functions, a
full-adder function and a full-subtractor function, that can simulate the functionality of a real full-adder and full-
subtractor circuit using the fully-homomorphic properties of FHE, respectively. By combining a sequence of the
full-adder (or full-subtractor) function, we carry out a binary addition +ˆ (or subtraction −ˆ) function that can perform
the addition (or subtraction) of two cipher strings. After that, the multiplication function ×ˆ can be developed by
calculating the partial products of the input cipher strings, shifting each of the product to the left, and adding them
together using the addition function +ˆ. Similarity, division function ÷ˆ consists of subtraction function −ˆ and the
shifting mechanism. We explain the details in the following.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 6. Logical circuits of (a) a full-adder and (b) a full-subtractor.
Binary addition +ˆ. As shown in Figure (6)(a), in electronics, a real full-adder is composed by a number of
logical operations. The real full-adder adds the operand bits a and b with the carried-in bit carryin received from
the previous full-adder, and output the answer bit sum and carry-out bit carryout as the result. The operations of
a real full-adder can be expressed in terms of XOR and AND as follows:
sum = a ⊕ b ⊕ carryin,
carryout = (a ∧ b) ⊕ (carryin ∧ (a⊕ b)).
(12)
As these operations are in bit level the same as the inputs of FHE, we then can convert the real full-adder into
ciphertext field using the fully-homomorphic properties. By replacing the XOR- and AND- operations with addition
and multiplication, respectively, Equation (12) is transformed into the following formulas:
csum = ca + cb + ccarryin,
ccarryout = (ca × cb) + (ccarryin × (ca + cb)),
(13)
where csum, ca, cb and ccarry denote the corresponding ciphers of sum, a, b and carry, respectively. Based on
Equation (13), we then develop a function, called virtual full-adder function which executes the functionality of the
real full-adder circuit in ciphertext field. After that, let each similarity score S(w) in PP-SimRank use l bits for its
binary representation. By connecting l virtual full-adder function together, i.e., each function takes the output cipher
ccarryout of previous full-adder function as its input carry-in cipher ccarryin , we can carry out a binary addition
function +ˆ to add cipher strings of Θ(w) in ciphertext field.
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Binary multiplication ×ˆ. We further utilize the binary addition function +ˆ to implement the binary multiplication
function ×ˆ. Specifically, similar to what we usually do in the computation of multiplying two decimal numbers,
the binary multiplication function ×ˆ can be carried out by computing a sequence of partial products, shifting the
resulting partial products to the left, and finally applying the binary addition fuction +ˆ to add the products together.
Similarly, we begin from the real full-subtractor circuit and then explain the implementations of binary subtraction
−ˆ and binary devision ÷ˆ operations in ciphertext field.
Binary subtraction −ˆ. The logical operations of a real full-subtractor shown in Figure 6(b) can be expressed as
follows:
diff = a⊕ b⊕ borrowin,
borrowout = ( a ∧ b) ∨ (borrowin ∧ (a⊕ b) )
= ((1 ⊕ a) ∧ b) ∨ (borrowin ∧ (1⊕ (a⊕ b))),
(14)
where the NOT-operation on a bit a is achieved by computing the value of (1 ⊕ a). Let
t1 = (1 ⊕ a) ∧ b,
t2 = borrowin ∧ (1 ⊕ (a ⊕ b).
(15)
Based on the truth tables in Figure 5, borrowout can also be expressed in terms of XOR- and AND- logics.
borrowout = (t1 ⊕ t2) ⊕ (t1 ∧ t2). (16)
Accordingly, a virtual full-subtractor in ciphertext field is derived in Equation (17) (from Equations (14), (15) and
(16)) again by substituting the XOR- and AND- logics with addition and multiplication, respectively.
cdiff = ca + cb + cborrowin ,
cborrowout = (ct1 + ct2) + (ct1 × ct2),
(17)
where
ct1 = (c1 + ca)× cb,
ct2 = (cborrowin × (c1 + (ca + cb)).
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TABLE I
THE EXECUTION TIME OF FHE ENCRYPTION, FHE RE-ENCRYPTION AND CIPHERTABLE LOOK-UP W.R.T. VARIOUS SECURITY LEVELS.
FHE FHE CipherTable
Security Level Encryption Re-Encryption Look-up
(dimension) (sec) (sec) (sec)
512 0.217 6.3 0.020
2048 2.084 34.1 0.254
8192 20.300 185 2.397
By regarding a virtual full-subtractor as a basic unit, we can thus implement a binary subtractor −ˆ in a similar way
of building a binary addition +ˆ, where each function takes the output cipher cborrowout of previous full-subtractor
function as its input borrow-in cipher cborrowin .
Binary division ÷ˆ. The binary division function ÷ˆ also can be carried out by utilizing a sequence of binary
subtraction function −ˆ. Similar to the decimal division, the binary division function ÷ˆ computes the quotient cipher
string by iteratively subtracting divisor from the dividend using binary subtraction function −ˆ and shifting the
divisor to the right after each binary subtraction −ˆ. Each ciphertext in the quotient cipher string is determined by
adding the output borrow cipher cborrowout of the binary subtraction −ˆ with a cipher c1 = Encpk(1), which is
equivalent to the NOT-operation (1⊕ borrowout) in the plaintext field.
B. Efficiency improvement
FHE encrypts bits into ciphertexts (with random noises) in the form of very big integers to achieve semantic
security. A side effect, however, is that operations on big integers usually cost a lot of time. In this subsection, we
propose to reduce the execution time of PP-SimRank in three ways: reducing the number of binary multiplications
in the score calculations, replacing the FHE encryption with look-up, and carrying out the FHE re-encryption
mechanism by Re-encryption protocol instead.
Reducing the number of binary multiplications. Equations (10) and (11) give the detailed calculations of
SimRank similarity in ciphertext field. We note that the execution efficiency can be improved by replacing the
binary multiplication ×ˆ of (Θ(wx) ×ˆ π) with simple multiplications ×. Specifically, recall that as mentioned in
Section III-C, a ciphertext π represents a bit ǫ in the plaintext, and each SimRank score Θ(wx) in the ciphertext
field is represented in the form of a cipher string corresponding to the binary representation (a bit string) of S(wx)
in plaintexts. Because ǫ is either 0 or 1, multiplying ǫ with the bit sting of S(wx) can be carried out by AND-
operations between them. Correspondingly, in the ciphertext field, we can achieve (Θ(wx) ×ˆ π) in Equations (10)
and (11) by multiplying (corresponding to AND-operation in plaintext field) π with every ciphertext in the cipher
string of Θ(wx), instead of performing the time consuming binary multiplication.
CipherTable look-up. Table I shows the FHE encryption time of one bit with respect to different security levels1.
1In [3], they use lattices of 512, 2048 and 8192 dimensions to provide security levels called as toy, small and medium.
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Accordingly, it would be infeasible if Alice and Bob encrypt their data by calling the FHE encryption function.
To solve this problem, we use CipherTable look-up instead which is at least 8 times faster than FHE encryption
according to the results in Table I. That is, since there are only two possible inputs 1 and 0 of FHE, Alice and
Bob can share the public key pk in advance and respectively prepare a CipherTable containing a set of ciphertexts
w.r.t. the plaintexts {0, 1} before they really start computing the similarity measures on their joint data. Therefore,
when PP-SimRank is performed, Alice and Bob can encrypt their data in step 2 of Figure 3 by simply choosing a
corresponding ciphertext from their own CipherTable, instead of calling FHE encryption function. As FHE outputs
different ciphertexts (by introducing a random noise in the encryption) and the CipherTable is built by each party
itself, this replacement is satisfactory.
Re-encryption protocol. The PP-SimRank protocol protects the link information using FHE. For a given bit
representing direct connection or disconnection, FHE will introduce a random noise into the encryption to output
different ciphertexts. Due to the random noise, the inverse mapping from ciphers to the bit becomes challenging.
However, the noise in a ciphertext will propagate and grow with the homomorphic operations operated on it. When
the magnitude of noise reaches a certain limitation2, the ciphertext will not be able to be correctly decrypted. A
re-encryption mechanism that can refresh the ciphertext by reducing the associated noise is thus required.
The work in [3] has suggested a mechanism, called bootstrapping, for re-encryption. The idea of bootstrapping
is to refresh a ciphertext by decrypting the ciphertext homomorphically with the encrypted secret key. As shown in
Table I, however, the re-encryptions of bootstrapping under various security level are very time-consuming. Instead,
we propose an more efficient re-encryption protocol for our problem scenario. The results in Table I shows that
our re-encryption protocol runs at least 77 times faster than FHE re-encryption method.
Specifically, when it is detected3, by Bob, that the magnitude of noise associating with a ciphertext reaches a
limitation during the computation, Bob asks Alice’s help for re-encryption. The noisy ciphertext is sent to Alice.
Alice then decrypts the noisy ciphertext using the secret key sk (which is kept strictly to Alice), and encrypts the
resulting bit again using the same public key pk. Here, as mentioned previously, Alice can perform the encryption
by looking up her CipherTable, rather than call the FHE encryption function. The re-encryption efficiency is thus
improved significantly. After that, a corresponding new ciphertext is sent back to Bob for subsequent computation.
This re-encryption protocol will not damage the private link protection. For Bob, what he sends out and receives
are both ciphertexts. Therefore, he cannot get additional information about the links in Alice’ data. On the other
hand, although Alice knows the true value of the received bit by decryption, she does not know the semantic
meaning of the bit since a bit can be any link information in Bob’s data, any bit in the binary representation of a
similarity score between any two vertices, or even a temporary bit appearing only during the computation process.
Consequently, the re-encryption protocol is efficient and satisfactory for our problem scenario.
2Given the public key, FHE [3] allows one to test the magnitude of noise in a ciphertext. If the noise grows beyond a certain ratio of the
decryption radius, there is a demand of re-encryption.
3Refer to Footnote 2.
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V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Security of PP-SimRank
The purpose of PP-SimRank is to achieve SimRank similarity score co-computation based on a joint virtual
network G = (V A ∪ V B, U, EA ∪ EB) while protecting every link information in both EA and EB from being
stolen. In the analysis, we ask two questions: (1) Can Bob who has the whole network (in virtual) derive the links
in Alice’s data by generating many plaintext-ciphertext pairs with the given public key pk? (2) Can Alice or Bob
derive the links in the other’s data after the similarities between nodes in U is revealed?
The first question is also known as a birthday attack [8]. Since, in PP-SimRank, the public key pk generated
by Alice is shared with Bob, Bob is able to generate cipher-plaintext pairs by himself. The cipher-plaintext pairs
he generated may contain a cipher that collides with an encrypted data received from Alice. The link information
in EA, therefore, has a chance to be stolen by Bob. However, according to the study [3], the ciphertext space of
FHE is enormous large, i.e., ciphertext c ∈ Zd = {1, 2, . . . , d} where log2 d ∈ {195764, 785006, 3148249} w.r.t.
the security level toy, small and median. Under the analysis of the birthday problem [8], the expected number of
ciphertexts Bob has to generate before he finds the first collision is about
√
π
2
d, which is still significantly large.
Hence, the probability that Bob finds a collision and steals the link information from Alice is negligibly small.
For the second question, the answer is “No”. The reason is that, in addition to having the pairwise similarity
scores S(wy) between nodes in U , a party also needs the pairwise similarity scores S(wx) between the nodes
in (V A ∪ V B) so that the link information of the other party can be derived by solving linear algebra problems.
However, at the end of PP-SimRank protocol, the similarity score S(wx) between the nodes in (V A ∪ V B) are
not available for both Alice and Bob since Alice does not have the data and Bob does not have the secret key for
decryption. Consequently, in a semi-honest security model, PP-SimRank does not give a chance to a party to steal
the link information of the others.
B. Communication and computation complexity
We illustrate the communication and computational cost of PP-SimRank on a joint network G = (V A ∪
V B, U, EA ∪ EB) in this section. Assume there are m nodes in (V A ∪ V B), n nodes in U , and the dimension
of the node-pair graph matrix M is Cm2 × Cn2 , i.e., O(m2) ×O(n2). Let l be the number of bits used for binary
representation of a SimRank score in plaintext, and k be the number of bits for a ciphertext transmission. First, we
analyze the computational cost on the calculator, Bob. To construct the virtual node-pair graph G2 in step 3 of PP-
SimRank, Bob computes each element πx,y in M based on Equations (7), consisting of two additions + and three
multiplications ×. Therefore, Bob performs totally O(m2n2) additions and multiplications to fill the whole graph
matrix. Next, in step 4 of PP-SimRank, Bob performs the SimRank score computation in ciphertext field according
to Equations (10) and (11). For each score Θ(wx) (or Θ(wy)), the required arithmetic operations on the cipher
string include O(1) binary division ÷ˆ, O(n2) (or O(m2)) binary additions +ˆ and O(n2+1) (or O(m2+1)) binary
multiplications ×ˆ, because the number of nodes in (V A∪V B)2 and U2 are O(m2) and O(n2), respectively. We can
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TABLE II
THE EXECUTION TIME (SEC) OF (BINARY) ARITHMETIC OPERATIONS IN CIPHERTEXT FIELD.
Arithmetic Operation
Security Level (dimension)
512 2048 8192
+ 1.0× 10−5 3.0× 10−5 1.4× 10−4
× 4.67× 10−3 0.03 0.135
+ˆ 0.81 5.58 54.92
−ˆ 1.11 8.61 92.7
×ˆ 5.30 47.06 584.00
÷ˆ 22.39 191.94 1961.00
TABLE III
THE NUMBERS OF RE-ENCRYPTIONS INVOLVED DURING VARIOUS OPERATIONS.
Arithmetic Operation
Num. of Re-encryptions
max Avg. min
+,×, +ˆ, −ˆ 0 0 0
×ˆ 40 36.04 33
÷ˆ 280 224.31 191
further improve the performance by replacing the binary multiplication of (Θ(w) ×ˆ π) in Equations (10) and (11)
with l simple multiplications × as explained in Section IV-B. The complexity for computing a Θ(wx) (or Θ(wy))
therefore becomes O(1) binary division ÷ˆ, O(n2) (or O(m2)) binary additions +ˆ, O(n2l) (or O(m2l)) simple
multiplications and O(1) binary multiplication. The total binary arithmetic operations required in one iteration to
compute all the SimRank scores are thus O(m2+n2) binary divisions, O(m2+n2) binary multiplications, O(m2n2)
binary additions and O(m2n2l) simple multiplications. Table II shows the execution efficiency of each (binary)
arithmetic operation in ciphertext field.
In PP-SimRank, the communication between Alice and Bob occurs in three steps, including encrypted link data
transmission after step 2, resulting cipher SimRank score transmission after step 5 and re-encrypt protocol required
during computation. First, assuming that Alice has |V A| nodes that exclusively owned by herself. She thus needs
totally (n|V A|) bits to encode all the link information between V A and U and transmits totally O(kn|V A|) bits data
to Bob for subsequent calculations. Second, after completing the SimRank score computation, Bob will send O(n2)
noisy cipher SimRank scores Θ′(wy) = Θ(wy)+ˆry to Alice after step 5. Since each cipher score is represented by
l ciphers and each cipher needs k bits for transmission, the communication cost is O(n2lk) bits. Finally, as shown
in Table III, the times of re-encryption required vary with binary arithmetic operations on different ciphertexts.
Here we evaluate the communication cost in one re-encryption protocol: Alice and Bob send one cipher to each
other. Therefore, the cost is O(k) bits.
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VI. EXTENSION TO MULTI-PARTY SCENARIO
In this section, we further extend the PP-SimRank protocol to a more general case, i.e., multi-party scenario.
We assume there are totally s parties and the i-th party holds an information network Gi = (V i, U, Ei) where the
vertex sets V 1, V 2, . . . , and V s are mutually disjoint. The purpose is to let all parties learn the similarity between
nodes in U based on their joint network G = (∪V i, U,∪Ei) while the links hold by each party are strictly known
to itself.
Similar to the two-party scenario, here PP-SimRank also asks two of the s parties to act as a cryptographer
(Alice) and a calculator (Bob) and to perform their duty respectively. For the rest parties, they encrypt their data
with the public key pk received from the cryptographer, and then transmit the encrypted data to the calculator
after step 2 of PP-SimRank protocol (shown in Figure (3)). In addition, each of the rest parties also determines a
random number list Ri containing Cn2 elements, encrypts each element riy , y = {1, . . . , Cn2 }, with pk, and sends
the encrypted random numbers to the calculator. After the calculation of SimRank similarity is completed in step
4, the calculator adds each of the resulting SimRank scores Θ(wy) with a set of random numbers r1y, r2y, . . . , rs−1y
collected from all parties except the cryptographer. Therefore, at the end, the cryptographer will hold the noisy
scores S′(wy) after decryption, and each of the other parties will have a list of random numbers that have been
added to the noisy scores S′(wy). The correct SimRank scores then can be derived after all parties exchange these
information with each other.
Now consider the corresponding complexities. Assume there are totally m nodes in (V 1 ∪ V 2 ∪ · · · ∪ V s), i.e.,
m = |V 1| + |V 2| + · · · + |V s|) and n nodes in U , i.e., n = |U |. The dimension of the node-pair graph matrix
M is therefore O(m2) × O(n2), which is the same with the dimension in the two-party scenario. As the result,
the computational complexity of multi-party PP-SimRank is identical to that we have analyzed in the two-party
scenario. On the other hand, the communication cost slightly increases. Assume that each score uses l bits for its
binary representation and each ciphertext needs k bits for its transmission. There is a new cost O((s− 2)n2lk) for
transmitting (s−2) encrypted lists of random numbers from all parties, except the cryptographer and the calculator,
to the calculator, while the cost for encrypted link data transmission becomes O((m− |V B|)nk) bits. The cost for
transmitting the resulting cipher SimRank scores remains the same.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of privacy-preserving co-computation of link-based similarity
measure in a distributed bipartite network, and proposed a new privacy-preserving protocol, PP-SimRank, as a
solution. PP-SimRank strictly protects each party’s link information and reveals nothing but the desired similarity
measures on the (virtual) joint network. We also implemented the basic binary arithmetic operations in ciphertext
field to securely compute SimRank scores under fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) and demonstrated the
potential of FHE in privacy-preserving data mining.
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